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1. Introduction
Humań history is a history of increasing population, increasing pro- 
duction and increasing consumption. Production and consumption are 
accompanied by the creation of waste, and an important question is 
what has to be done with this waste. Technological advance makes it 
possible to reduce the amount of waste in the production process and to 
apply pre-cycling, the reduction of, for example, consumption and pro­
duction waste by using new, less watefull packaging materials. How- 
ever, the continuing increase in consumption and the aspirations of 
countries in transition like Poland and many developing countries are 
creating many challenges in the field of waste management. Also many 
developed countries, like Norway, face an increase in the production of 
waste [Nagoda, this volume], What is being done with this waste is im­
portant, for example whether it is dumped, or whether it is recycled and 
re-used, as is morę and morę the case in highly developed countries. As 
Nagoda shows, although waste creation has increased in Norway, the in­
crease is being recycled, keeping the waste dumped per capita at the 
same level. This paper gives an overview of some institutional and logis- 
tic problems in waste management with reference to the Polish situa- 
tion. Institutional factors mainly concern factors influencing human 
behaviour and the activities of governance structures (like firms, go- 
vernment agencies, non-governmental organisations, government bu- 
reaucracy, and all types of organisational structures), and in this way in­
fluencing the efficiency of waste management. Logistic problems are 
discussed in the framework of reverse logistics, which concerns the flow 
of waste products from the finał user of the product back to the producer
240 JOOST PLATJE
who can re-use, re-cycle or combust them or to a waste dump. Finally, 
some practical problems in Poland are discussed with respect to law and 
social Capital. The argument is that legislation is often insufficient and 
unclearly formulated, while a lack of social Capital (trust and propensity 
to co-operate) makes it morę difficult to introduce new forms of waste 
management and to create new structures to create sustainable waste 
management. Data are presented from a survey among 1,116 Polish 
firms carried out during the first half of 2001. The first ąuestion con- 
cerns whether these companies trust their employees, suppliers, custo- 
mers, local government, central government and banks. The second 
ąuestion concerns whether they perceive the tax office, competitors, local 
government, central government and banks as co-operative.
2. Institutions influencing waste management
Economic activities by human beings, firms, organisations and other 
forms of governance are influenced by institutions, the rules of the gamę 
in society [North, 1990]. In fact the „play of the gamę” of economic acti- 
vity is influenced by formal rules of the gamę (e.g. legał codes, the pro- 
perty rights order) and informal rules of the gamę (e.g. culture, menta- 
lity, ideology, norms of behaviour). However, human beings themselves 
may also be influenced by their genetic inheritance, other inborn and 
acąuired human capabilities, and markets and other governance struc­
tures (the play of the gamę).
Of all factors influencing human behaviour, genetic factors change 
most slowly. An important ąuestion is to what extent our genes influence 
our behaviour. For example, is our behaviour concerning waste produc- 
tion and re-use and the “larger environment” based on genes developed at 
the time of the “gatherer-hunter” when the earth was “unlimited” and re- 
sources available for free from naturę, due to the smali human popula- 
tion? In this case we are rather likely to have a predisposition for increa- 
sing consumption without taking the conseąuences into consideration, 
making morę sustainable waste management morę difficult.
Inborn and acąuired human capabilities are another factor influencing 
human behaviour. For example, people are not able to process all the In­
formation relevant to making decisions [Simon, 1950], In such a case pe­
ople are likely to use rules of thumb or routines [van de Mortel, 2000], 
thus people fali back on mental models, i.e. their cultural background, 
mentality, norms of behaviour, etc. In this context it can be argued that 
people are bounded rational, which means that their behaviour is inten- 
dedly rational but only limitedly so [Williamson, 1998], People do not 
have perfect knowledge about the past, present and futurę. Thus, dęci-
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sions are based on available knowledge and information. Furthermore, 
skills are limited and people make mistakes. The effect of a decision may 
turn out to be sub-optimal. Another problem is opportunistic behaviour. 
In other words, people tend to lie and to cheat [Molho, 1997], This is 
another factor that makes the introduction of sustainable waste manage- 
ment systems morę difficult, and for this reason, technically superior So­
lutions may in practice be inferior to other alternatives. When designing 
a system, it is important to take such factors into consideration.
Another field of discussion is to what extent formal and informal insti- 
tutions stimulate or hamper the development of waste management. For 
example, experiences from the past, which cumulated in what we cali cul- 
ture, mentality, norms of behaviour, etc., influence people’s way of life, 
which in turn influences the „production” and management of waste. For 
example, a culture that values (an increase in) consumption highly is not 
very likely to help reducing the problem of waste. Do we believe that na­
turę has to serve man, or has man to live in harmony with naturę? Is the 
“ever expanding consumption society” becoming a global phenomenon? In 
such a case the ever expanding waste creation is also likely to become 
a global phenomenon. These informal institutions, together with formal 
institutions, provide incentives for economic activity, and thus also for 
waste management. Experiences and incentives influence the degree of 
co-operation, co-ordinated social behaviour, and responsiveness to con- 
cerns about processes. In other words, they influence human behaviour 
[Ben-Ner and Putterman, 1998], An example of incentives provided by 
formal institutions is the ąuestion what type of property rights are likely 
to create the least amount of waste. In the case of private property, the 
owner is morę likely to take care of it than in the case of public or com- 
mon property, because he/she is morę directly affected by the conse- 
ąuences of his/her behaviour. However, when property rights are not com- 
pletely established, for example due to holes in the law or difficulties with 
law enforcement, problems are likely to come into being. Furthermore, 
waste trade is a well-known phenomenon. For example, selling it to a fo- 
reign country where someone is willing to dump waste for financial gain, 
but negative the effects are borne by the rest of the population when they 
do not have enough opportunities to defend their rights.
Finally, markets and the governance structure in which waste manage­
ment takes place are important. Waste management can take place in 
many different organisational forms, but in generał co-operation between 
different economic actors is important. Market prices, together with in- 
centives provided by, for example, government regulations, determine 
whether it pays to recycle dump waste. In the management of waste, lo- 
gistic Solutions are important, which are discussed in the next section.
16— Sustainable..
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3. Waste Management in the Logistic Chain
Generally speaking, production and consumption create waste. In the 
process of waste management, waste can be pre-cycled and re-cycled, 
and there is “unusable waste”, which has to be stored or destroyed. 
When handling waste, it has to be taken into consideration that there 
are short-run costs of waste management (e.g. landfills, wastewater) and 
long-run threats (e.g. nuclear waste) with many unknowns. Futurę tech- 
nological development is important for creating possibilities of using cur- 
rently unusable waste. One factor making waste management morę 
complicated is that when the availability of resources diminishes, there 
will be stronger incentives for re-cycling. Generally speaking, technical, 
organisational and human factors influence the sustainability of waste 
management. Table 1 gives a simple representation of waste manage­
ment in the logistic chain. Logistics concerns the flow of goods from the 
producer of primary goods to the finał customer. In the production pro­
cess waste is produced, and during consumption waste is produced. This 
waste is „reversed” in the logistic chain (or not when it is illegally 
dumped, for example), and this process concerns waste management.
Table 1. The logistic chain







Reverse logistics / ecologistics / waste management
_______________J______________
Source: Adapted from van Goor et al., 1998, 5.
The flows of goods are accompanied by flows of information (e.g. Infor­
mation connected with how waste has to be transported to which place 
and what has to be done with it, what problems are involved, who is re- 
sponsible for what, organising the whole venture and so on). When infor­
mation is distorted, problems appear with waste management. In the 
logistics of waste management two types of problems can be distin- 
guished: „hard logistic” problems and „soft logistic” problems. “Hard 
logistic” problems concern infrastructure, information systems and 
available technology. “Soft logistics” problems concern the institutions 
discussed above, like problems with co-operation, consciousness, human 
behaviour, incentives given by institutions, etc. When, for example, “soft 
logistic” problems exist, the introduction of new technological Solutions
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is difficult. Solving “soft logistic” problems may have larger positive ef- 
fects than introducing new technologies, especially given the limit on 
funds [See Boehme et al., 1998], Furthermore, when we do not know 
how to make use of current technical opportunities, how can we expect 
to make use of morę advanced technologies?
4. Selected problems in Poland
- law and social Capital
4.1. Law
A proper legał framework with elear rules, which are enforced, stimu- 
lates efficiently functioning waste management. However, when looking 
at the creation of laws, it seems that they often are created based on 
a vision of an “Idealtype” [Wyrzykowski, 1995] and shaped by interest 
groups. When creating new legał acts, their practical implications (e.g. 
reaction of individuals, practical problems with Information dispersion, 
lack of skills of people who have to enforce the law, lack of logistic struc- 
tures for implementation) do not often seem to be taken into conside- 
ration. Furthermore, for example when approximating EU laws, there 
exists a danger that laws are created simply because they have to be cre­
ated. As a result, problems can be expected with their implementation 
and enforcement. Such a situation certainly does not support the cre­
ation of efficient waste management, but will rather lead to higher 
transaction costs (the costs of making an exchange [Barzel, 1989] con- 
sisting of Information, negotiation and control costs) and adverse incen- 
tives when the newly developed legał system is unclear, contains contra- 
dictions and is difficult to enforce.
Another problem is a lack of physical and human Capital, incompetence, 
unfriendliness and corruption in public administration, which inereases 
costs for economic actors involved, complex and unclear tax law, as well 
as a customer unfriendly tax collector, and an inefficient judiciary.
4.2. Social Capital
Although many definitions exist, the emphasis is on trust as a factor 
determining social Capital. Trust can be defined at the individual and 
the social level. At the individual level, trust is important in an economic 
transaction, as it concerns the “mutual confidence among parties to an 
economic transaction” [Raiser, 1999, 3; see also Paldom and Tinggaard 
Svendsen, 2000, 342], On the social level trust can be defined as “social 
Capital facilitating the provision of collective goods” [Raiser, 1999, 3], In
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other words, it is “the capability that arises from the prevalence of trust 
in a society or in certain parts of it” [Fukuyama, 1996, 26],
Zucker [1986, discussed in Raiser, 1999, 4—5] and Raiser et al. [2001, 
2-3] distinguish three types of trust, ascribed trust, process-based trust 
and extended (generalised) trust, presented in Table 2. Following Raiser, 
social Capital in the form of trust can be formal and informal. Informal so- 
cial Capital concerns ascribed trust and process-based trust. Ascribed 
trust concerns transactions between individuals having family ties or 
close friends. Process-based trust is trust which is built-up in repeated 
transactions, and is a form of transaction-specific investment. Trust helps 
to build up a reputation, which has a signalling function. Informal social 
Capital is rather a private good, but also has features of a public good. It is 
a private good in the sense that it is an investment in social networks by 
individuals [Bordieu, 1993]. In such a case transaction costs are lower. 
For example, as the characteristics of the contract partner are known, In­
formation costs are very Iow, and know-how transfer is easier. Further- 
more, when there is trust that the partner will not lie or cheat (no oppor- 
tunistic behaviour), no special contractual safeguards are required. 
Monitoring costs in case of trust are Iow, as contracts are rather “self-en- 
forcing”, for example because of the fear of loss of reputation, which is 
a business-asset. Trust in workers can be motivation enhancing, while the 
organisation can be organised morę flexibly and responsibilities can be 
transferred to lower levels in the hierarchy, due to the reduction of the 
agency problem. A lack of trust creates barriers to co-operation. This has 
an influence at all levels of social and economic life. Not only transaction 
costs of using the market increase and adaptive efficiency deteriorates, 
but within organisations agency problems may increase (increasing ma- 
nagerial transaction costs) and political coalitions may become morę diffi- 
cult (increasing transaction costs in the political process), making it morę 
difficult for the government to step in where the market fails (e.g. when 
there are high transaction costs of using the market).
However, ascribed and process-based trust can lead to the exclusion of 
individuals who are not a “member of the club”, in other words, a Iow 
propensity to co-operate. This can hamper innovation, adaptive effi­
ciency (the ability to change governance structures when (relative) 
transaction costs change as a conseąuence of technological and/or insti- 
tutional development) and expansion of governance structures.1 For ex- 
ample, family firms are not likely to be open to non-family members. As 
a conseąuence, smali firms are to prevail. In other words, there is a lack
1In such a case markets may fail morę often, making bureaucratic Solutions (e.g. go- 
yernment), with its lower-powered incentives, morę attractive.
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of spontaneous sociability, “the capacity to form new associations and to 
cooperate with them within the terms of reference they establish” 
[Fukuyama, 1996, 27]. In former socialist countries, for example, many 
people relied on family and close friends, as participating in broader net- 
works was risky because of the suppressive system. At the “top of soci- 
ety” there was a closed nomenclatura network. These networks are not 
open to outsiders, while often being non-transparent. As Raiser et al. 
[2001] argue, when such “connections” exist with public officials, this 
can lead to corruption and clientelism, and undermine trust in public in- 
stitutions. As Rose-Ackerman argues, “otherwise admirable norms of be- 
haviour can, under some conditions, prove costly for economic efficiency 
and development” [1998, 303]. This also may lead to situations where 
people in certain positions assign positions to people they trust (e.g. 
friends). Trust is important here, because people rather cover each other 
in connection with corrupt deals [Ibid., 305], Informal social Capital also 
has public good features, as at the local level it may facilitate collective 
action and the provision of public goods in smali communities [Coleman, 
1998], Ali in all, informal social Capital can have positive and negative 
effects on economic performance, making the effect uncertain.
Formal social Capital concerns extended trust and confidence and trust 
in the property rights order, government institutions, etc. This type of 
trust reduces uncertainty, ąuestioning of contracts, rules, etc. (leading to 
court cases), and in turn lowers transaction costs. Social Capital can, for 
example, reduce the problem of rent-seeking. When there is a strong 
value of minę and thine, you do not have to care so much about leaving 
the door of your house or car open, as can still be observed in smali some 
villages. Furthermore, equity may be promoted, which may tighten social 
cohesion and reduce the cost of social antagonism. Extended trust lowers 
control costs, as it facilitates the enforcement task of “institutional gover- 
nance” like the judiciary or government agencies. Relying only on formal 
procedures for contract enforcement can be very costly. On the other 
hand, as Raiser et al. [2001] argue, efficient “institutional governance” 
supports the building of extended trust. Process-based trust is a neces- 
sary, but not sufficient condition for extended trust to develop. Experience 
with “institutional governance” and credibility is in fact also a process, 
thus the creation of trust in public institutions is to a certain extent also 
“process-based”. When “institutional enforcement” is efficient and credi- 
ble, this lowers the incentives for opportunistic behaviour, and in turn the 
related transaction costs. Extended trust and propensity to co-operate can 
improve adaptive efficiency, as networks are morę open to outsiders. Go- 
vernance structures can react faster to technological and institutional 
changes, and new transaction cost minimising Solutions may be intro-
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Table 2. Different types of trust
Type of trust Definition Influence on transaction costs and adaptive efficiency
Informal social 
Capital — As- 
cribed trust
Trust with both private and 
public good characteristics. 
Between family members 
(kinship), close friends.
Lowers costs of transactions be­
tween individuals.
Relational capital - inefficient 
when restricting outside options, 
because these would hamper 
one’s reputation. Can lead to 
corruption, etc.
Unclear effect on economic per­
formance.
Informal social 
Capital - Pro- 
cess-based trust
Trust with both private and 
public good characteristics. 
Between individuals who have 
repeatedly concluded transac- 
tions with each other, not be- 
ing loyal to a specific group
Formal social 
Capital - Gener- 
alised or ex- 
tended trust; 
confidence and 




Trust as a public good, facili- 
tating transactions with un- 
known or little known indi- 
viduals or organisations.
This type of trust can be en- 
forced by religious values, be- 
longing to the same social/cul- 
tural group, etc.
Extended trust facilitates effi- 
cient third-party enforcement. 
Lowers transaction costs.
Efficient third-party enforcement 
stimulates extended trust.
Supports institutional eąuilibrium. 
Positive effect on economic per­
formance.
Source: adapted from Raiser [1999] and Raiser et al. [2001],
duced faster [for the economic importance of social Capital, see Casson, 
1993; Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1996; Raiser, 1997; Raiser, 1999; 
Paldom and Tinggaard Svendsen, 2000; Raiser et al. 2001], Overall, for- 
mal social Capital positively influences economic performance.
Summarising, a high level of trust facilitates the introduction of new 
Solutions for solving problems. For example, when people trust each 
other, they do not have to control whether others do their job or to spend 
resources in order to prevent cheating. A high propensity to co-operate, 
for example, facilitates the creation of new governance structures and lo- 
gistic frameworks for solving problems or introducing new Solutions (e.g. 
techniąues, laws). When there is Iow trust and a Iow propensity to co- 
-operate, problems can be expected in this field because of the higher 
(transaction) costs of developing and implementing, for example, new 
Systems of waste management.
4.3. The survey
Between January and July 2001, a survey was carried out among 
1,116 Polish companies. Firms from different places were approached.
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Wrocław (408 ąuestionnaires), Opole (289 ąuestionnaires), Wieluń (216 
questionnaires), Upper Silesia (86 ąuestionnaires), a rural region in 
Great Poland (101 ąuestionnaires); and other (16 ąuestionnaires). The 
ąuestionnaires were filled out by owners (75.5%), managers (15.4%) and 
others (6.4%). About 2.7% of the respondents did not report their status 
in the company.
The majority of the sample consists of companies employing between 
0 and 5 employees (746-66.8%). A total of 153 firms (13.7%) employed 
between 6 and 10 employees, 84 (7.5%) between 11 and 20 employees, 36 
(3.2%) between 21 and 50 employees, 26 (2.3%) between 51 and 100 em­
ployees, 21 (1.9%) between 101 and 200 employees, 9 (0.8%) between 201 
and 500 employees, 4 (0.4%) between 501 and 1000 employees, and 10 
(0.9%) morę than 1000 employees. The ąuestion was left unanswered by 
27 firms (2.4%).
In order to find out whether Iow- or high process-based trust and trust 
in government prevails among entrepreneurs, influencing transaction 
costs the opportunities for developing new governance structures, ques- 
tions were asked regarding who is trusted (their own employees, suppli- 
ers, customers, local government, central government, competitors, 
banks) and, in the experience of the firms, how co-operative the tax Of­
fice, competitors, the local government, the central government and 
banks are. With respect to trust, a scalę from 1 to 7 was used, 1 expres- 
sing complete distrust, 7 meaning complete trust. A 4 can be interpreted 
as not trusting, but also not distrusting. Table 3 presents all the an- 
swers, while Table 4 presents the modę (the value that occurs most of- 
ten), the median (the middle value) [Crawshaw and Chambers, 1994] 
and the mean with respect to trust. Using the chi-square goodness-of-fit 
test, a dependency between the type of “player” in the economy and the 
level of trust was observed at a 1% level of significance.
It has been suggested earlier that former socialist countries inhe- 
rited a relatively poor state of social Capital. Based on data from World 
Values Survey 1990 and 1995, Raiser et al. [2001, 4—7] argue that the 
degree of trust is significantly lower than is the case in OECD coun­
tries. Extended trust in the sense of the percentage of the population 
that think that people in generał can be trusted declined between 1990 
and 1995 in both transition and market economies. Poland saw the per­
centage decline from 34.5 to 17.9. Economic performance is not an ex- 
planatory variable, as Poland at that time was booming, while Russia 
showed a similar decline while its economy stagnated. Raiser [1997, 
23] shows with data that most people neither trust, nor distrust politi- 
cal institutions like government, parliament, civil servants and the po- 
lice. Based on data from World Yalues Survey 1995, New Democratic
Table 3. Who is trusted















































































































INSTITUTIONAL AND LOGISTIC CHALLENGES IN WASTE MANAGEMENT 249
Table 4. Who is trusted - modę, median and mean
Modę Median Mean
Employees (n = 1053) 7 6 5.64
Suppliers (n = 1060) 5 5 4.76
Customers (n = 1064) 5 5 4.52
Local Government (n = 1056) 1 2 2.94
Central Government (n = 1051) 1 2 2.51
Competitors (n = 1059) 1 3 2.67
Banks (n = 1063) 5 5 4.83
1 = complete distrust; 7 = complete trust
Barometer 1996 and Environment and Enterprise performance survey 
1999, Raiser et al. [2001, 16] conclude that trust in public institutions 
in former socialist countries is not significantly lower than in OECD 
countries. Studies from 1995 and 1999 on trust in the Belgian parlia- 
ment, the Belgian government and the Flemish government suggest 
a situation of neither trust nor distrust [Kampen et al., 2001; Kampen 
and Molenberghs, 2002], On the scalę from 1 to 7, the level of trust 
would be around 4. In a survey carried out in 9 former STEs on trust in 
formal institutions among 10,087 individuals in 1993 the mean for all 
those countries is 3.4 (standard deviation 1.8) on a scalę of 1 (maxi- 
mum distrust) to 7 (maximum trust) as used here. Mean for Poland 
was 3.5 (standard deviation 1.6). Concerning civil servants, the mean 
for all countries was 3.5 (standard deviation 1.6), and for Poland also 
3.5 (standard deviation 1.4).2
2 Data from Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna, New Democracies Barometer III, 1994 
and Rosę et al., 1997, 17. Presented in Raiser et al., 1997, 24.
The data of the survey presented here suggest that in 2001 trust in 
the government (local and central) was lower among entrepreneurs than 
was in generał the case in 1993, with a mean of 2.9 for trust in local go- 
vernment and a mean of 2.5 for trust in the central government. Al- 
though the sample in this study is different, it may be that the lower 
level of trust is connected with disappointment with government policy. 
At the time the survey was conducted, for example, the media reported 
a lot on huge problems with the government budget (it was madę pub- 
licly that it would be twice as big as assumed, while regularly reports on 
corruption were published).
Employees were trusted the most of all, which is not so surprising be- 
cause they are the closest to the employer/manager. The modę is 7,
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which means that the largest proportion of the firms in the survey have 
complete trust in their personnel. The median is 6, which can be inter- 
preted as a reasonable, but not very high level of trust. The trust in own 
employees is higher than for the other categories.
Banks and suppliers were second, with a modę and median of 5. Al- 
though the means for banks and suppliers are similar, there is diffe- 
rence in the distribution of trust. Firms tend to give morę extreme 
marks to banks. Banks morę often received 1 and 2 (very Iow trust) and 
6 and 7 (rather high trust), while suppliers morę often received 3, 4 
and 5. An explanation may be that the experience with banks may dif- 
fer greatly from bank to bank. Another possible explanation is con- 
nected with the result of a survey among 1037 Poles held in March 
2002 by the OBOP (Centre for Public Opinion Research) [OBOP, 2002]. 
According to this survey morę than two third of the Poles trust public 
banks. Only 38% trust private banks, while 39% distrust private 
banks. The difference between private and public banks was not taken 
into consideration in this survey. The data imply that some trust in 
banks and suppliers exist.
Trust in customers is on a similar level when looking at the modę 
and the median. However, when comparing trust in customers with 
trust in banks, a similar observation is madę as for the comparison be­
tween suppliers and banks. Morę firms assess banks with very Iow 
trust (1 or 2) or high trust (6 or 7), while customers receive morę 3, 4 
and 5. Clients seem to be a little bit less trusted that suppliers, as sup­
pliers receive morę 5, 6 and 7, while customers tend to be assessed with 
lower values.
There is a tendency that the “farther away” a market party or institu- 
tions from the firm (implying less repeated dealing), the lower the re- 
ported trust. While trust in customers is on a rather Iow level, local go- 
vernment, competitors and central government are distrusted. The modę 
for the three last categories is 1, implying that a large proportion of all 
companies completely distrusts those parties. Both local and central go- 
vernment have a median of 2, while competitors have a median of 3. The 
largest amount of firms has absolutely no trust in the central govern- 
ment, followed by competitors and the local government.
Summarising, some process-based and personal trust in economic 
partners seems to exist, creating room for development and co-operation. 
However, a ąuestion remains how open networks are. If networks are 
closed and not transparent, this may hamper the development of new 
governance structures. Low trust in competitors has positive and nega- 
tive aspects. The positive aspect is that this hampers co-operative beha- 
viour in the form of collusion, price agreements, creating barriers to en-
Table 5. Perceived co-operativeness of institutions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total NA































































































try, etc. However, as many firms are smali, they may have difficulties in 
facing the challenges of increasing regulation and increasing competi- 
tion in the process of EU accession. The very Iow trust in the different 
levels of government is worrying, as it hampers third-party enforcement 
of contacts, negatively influencing economic performance.
The generał tendency concerning Iow trust in the government is con- 
firmed when looking at the results on the question about how co-opera- 
tive, in the experience of the company, are the tax office, competitors, 
local government, central government and banks (Table 5 and 6). Re- 
spondents had the possibility to choose on a scalę from 1 (totally 
non-co-operative) to 7 (very co-operative), with 4 implying neither being 
non-co-operative nor co-operative. Using the chi-square goodness-of-fit 
test, dependency between the type of institution and co-operativeness 
has been observed at a 1% level of significance.
Table 6. Perceived co-operativeness of institutions - modę, median and mean
Modę Median Mean
Tax office 4 4 3.6
Competitors 1 2 2.55
Local government 1 2 2.31
Central government 1 1 1.96
Banks 4 5 4.27
1 = totally non-co-operative: 7 = veiy co-operative
Banks were reported to be most co-operative. However, a modę of 4 
and a median of 5 imply co-operativeness on a relatively Iow level. Tax 
offices are rather on the level of being neither co-operative nor 
non-co-operative, although almost 17% of the respondents perceive the 
tax office to be totally non-co-operative. Tax offices are considered to be 
less co-operative than banks. Competitors, local government and central 
government are considered to be non-co-operative, with competitors 
scoring the highest of the three, followed by local government and cen­
tral government with very Iow perceived co-operativeness. Morę than 
53% considers the central government to be completely non-co-operative, 
while this percentage for local government is 40% and for competitors al­
most 35%. These Iow averages may suggest a Iow level of co-operative- 
ness when those stakeholders are involved in eventual new economic 
initiatives, hampering economic development and possibilities for crea- 
ting a sustainable system of waste management.
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5. Concluding remarks
This paper presented institutional and logistic challenges in waste 
management. Many problems were identified which may hamper the in- 
troduction of efficient sustainable waste management, connected with 
human behaviour, problems of gaining Information, institutional factors, 
logistic problems, and so on. Problems with the creation of adeąuate 
laws and a lack of trust and propensity to co-operate regarding the intro- 
duction of new Solutions in waste management in Poland were identi­
fied. The aim of this paper is not to sketch a negative picture with the 
conclusion that everything will fail. It is important to identify existing 
and potential problems when trying to improve the management of 
waste so that one can attempt to avoid or reduce those problems. For ex- 
ample, a positive sign is that some process-based trust exists. This cre- 
ates opportunities for developing larger networks needed for developing 
a sustainable system of waste management.
Trust in local and central government and competitors is on a very 
Iow level. Banks are considered to be a little bit co-operative, tax offices 
rather neither co-operative nor non-cooperative, while competitors, local 
and central government are valued very Iow. The data for the tax office, 
local and central government may suggest a (perceived) inefficient pub- 
lic administration morę interested in maximising their budget than sup- 
porting entrepreneurship. With such a poor state of social Capital it is 
likely that morę resources are spent on contractual safeguards and nego- 
tiation costs when dealing with different levels of government as well as 
with unknown trade partners, or with establishing private-public part- 
nerships. But also problems may arise with competitors when co-opera- 
tion for a larger venture is needed as Iow trust in the government may 
imply difficulties with third-party enforcement. Trust is needed for de- 
veloping a sustainable and efficient system of waste management on the 
local level. The government may have an important task in stimulating 
co-operative Solutions within networks and promoting trust by informa- 
tion provision, participating in organising fairs, etc.3
3See Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996, mentioned in Raiser, 2001.
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